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The WTO members are conducting negotiations to clarify and improve disciplines on 
fisheries subsidies at the Doha Round. In this paper, I investigate how worldwide 
subsidy reform in the fisheries sector could affect fisheries output and resource stocks 
in a trading equilibrium. Using a simple static model of variable labor supply, I 
demonstrate that the effects of a reduction in subsidies on fisheries output will differ, 
depending on the conditions of the economy and fisheries management in different 
countries. A possible outcome of a reduction in non-capacity-enhancing subsidies is 
that fisheries output will rise in countries where catch quotas are not enforced and 
remain the same in countries where catch quotas are strictly enforced, expanding the 
total supply of fisheries products and reducing world fisheries resource stocks. Thus, 
this paper suggests that reducing some types of fisheries subsidies may yield 
unexpected and undesirable outcomes if fisheries resources are not properly 
managed. 
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Enormous amounts of money have been spent worldwide on subsidies for the ﬁsheries
industries. Many of those subsidies are possibly detrimental to resource conservation
and management (Clark et al., 2005). This is mainly because the subsidies support
overcapacity in the ﬁsheries.
While it is not easy to deﬁne and obtain accurate data on ﬁsheries subsidies, some
estimates are available.1 According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD, 2006), government ﬁnancial transfers (GFTs) to marine capture
ﬁsheries in OECD countries amounted to US$6.47 billion in 2003 (see Table 1). This
represented about 20% of the value of world production (i.e., landings) in the industry.
As shown in Table 2, most of the GFTs were devoted to management, research, and
enforcement (38%) and infrastructure (35%). Funds were also spent on decommission-
ing schemes (7%), income support (6%), and other cost-reducing transfers and direct
payments (7%). The last item includes price support schemes.
Table 1: GFTs to the Fisheries Sector in OECD Countries, 1996–2003
(Unit: Millions of USD)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
OECD Total 6,836 6,479 5,428 6,125 6,166 6,127 5,761 6,472
Source: Table 1.2 in OECD (2006).
Based on case studies of Japan, the European Union, Norway, the United States,
Russia, and China, Milazzo (1998) estimates the aggregate level of subsidies to ﬁsh-
eries in the world as US$14.0–20.5 billion annually.2 He categorizes ﬁsheries subsidies
into (i) budgeted subsidies, (ii) unbudgeted subsidies, (iii) cross-sectoral subsidies, (iv)
conservation subsidies, and (v) resource rent subsidies.3
1Detailed discussions on how to deﬁne ﬁsheries subsidies are provided by OECD (2006) and Khan et al. (2006).
2Data include diﬀerent years in the 1990s.
3Budgeted subsidies include development grants, state investments, foreign access payments, market promotion, and
price supports. Unbudgeted subsidies include subsidized loans, fuel tax exemptions, and income tax deferrals. Cross-
sectoral subsidies include aids to shipbuilding and aids to ﬁsheries infrastructure, such as ﬁshing ports. Conservation
2Table 2: Shares of GFTs by Program Objectives (2003)
USD %
million
Management, research, and enforcement 2,508 38.8
Infrastructure 2,263 35.0
Access payments 194 3.0
Decommissioning payments 432 6.7
Investment and modernization 206 3.2
Income support 435 6.7
Other cost-reducing transfers 454 7.0
Total 6,472 100.0
Source: Table 1.1 in OECD (2006).
Khan et al. (2006) and Sumaila et al. (2006) provide another estimate. Khan et al.
(2006) estimate global non-fuel ﬁsheries subsidies for 11 subsidy types from the database
of subsidy programs reported in marine capture ﬁsheries for 144 coastal countries (both
developed and developing countries) from 1995 to 2005.4 They estimate that global non-
fuel subsidies are US$25.7 billion annually. About 49% (US$12.7 billion) is provided
by 38 developed countries and the remaining 51% (US$13.0 billion) by 103 developing
countries. In developed countries, subsidies for ﬁsheries management programs and
services are the major program (US$5.1 billion). In developing countries, on the other
hand, ﬁshing port construction and renovation programs (US$7.3 billion) and ﬁshery
development projects and support services (US$2.2 billion) are the major programs.
Moreover, Sumaila et al. (2006) estimate global fuel subsidies at US$4.2–8.5 billion per
year.
subsidies include vessel and ﬁshing permit buybacks, stock enhancement, and R&D in clean harvesting gear. Finally,
resource rent subsidies include user fees.
4The eleven subsidy types are (i) ﬁsheries management programs and services; (ii) ﬁshery research and development;
(iii) boat construction, renewal and modernization programs; (iv) ﬁshing port construction and renovation programs;
(v) marketing support, processing and storage infrastructure programs; (vi) tax exemption programs; (vii) ﬁshing access
agreements; (viii) ﬁshery development projects and support services; (ix) ﬁsher assistance programs; (x) vessel buyback
programs; and (xi) rural ﬁshers community development programs. Khan et al. (2006) call (i) and (ii) “good subsidies,”
(iii) to (viii) “bad subsidies,” and (ix) to (xi) “ugly subsidies.” Good subsidies are deﬁned as subsidies that lead to
investments in natural capital assets to a socially optimal level. Bad subsidies, on the other hand, lead to disinvestments
in natural capital assets. Ugly subsidies may lead to investment or disinvestment in ﬁsheries resources.
3The use of ﬁsheries subsidies has also been discussed in the ﬁeld of international trade.
Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are currently conducting negotiations
to clarify and improve disciplines on ﬁsheries subsidies in the Rules Negotiations at
the Doha Round (WTO, 2007, 2008). At present, there are no speciﬁc regulations on
ﬁsheries subsidies in the WTO. The new regulations on ﬁsheries subsidies are planned as
additions to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement)
as Annex VIII. In the negotiations, the prohibition on certain forms of ﬁsheries subsidies
that may contribute to overcapacity and overﬁshing was discussed. At the same time,
the establishment of appropriate and eﬀective special and diﬀerential (S&D) treatment
for developing and least-developed countries is also discussed in the new regulations.
However, there are conﬂicting views over several issues. First, there are two basic
approaches to the prohibition on subsidies: a top-down approach and a bottom-up ap-
proach. Under the top-down approach, all ﬁsheries subsidies are prohibited and those
exempted from the prohibition are listed. Under the bottom-up approach, in contrast,
only speciﬁc subsidies that are prohibited are listed. Second, one view is that allowable
subsidies should be restricted to those not contributing to overcapacity and overﬁshing.
Another view is that some subsidies that may contribute to overcapacity and overﬁshing
should be exempted from the prohibition because of their importance to development pri-
orities. Third, in the draft of the new regulations (WTO, 2007), exceptions (both general
and S&D) are conditioned upon the establishment and operation of ﬁsheries manage-
ment systems and measures. It is, however, controversial whether the WTO, which is
not a ﬁsheries management organization, should use binding conditionality concerning
ﬁsheries management.
As is clear from the negotiations at the WTO, it is important to determine the impacts
of ﬁsheries subsidies on the capacity and incentives of people in the ﬁsheries sector,
resource management, and resource stocks. A common view is that some subsidies are
actually beneﬁcial to ﬁsheries management and conservation. Those subsidies include
subsidies for conserving the marine environment and enhancing resource stocks and
research.
4The main purpose of this paper is to analyze how ﬁsheries subsidies will aﬀect the
incentive of people in the ﬁsheries sector. I focus on two types of subsidies: one type is
subsidies for income support; another type is subsidies for price supports that raise the
domestic producer price of ﬁsheries products. In the Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of
the AD and SCM Agreements (WTO, 2007), which is currently the basis for negotiations
at the Doha Round of the WTO, these two types of subsidies are included in subsidies
that should be prohibited.5 Thus, an analysis of these two types of ﬁsheries subsidies
could provide some implications for negotiations at the WTO. I illustrate how the eﬀects
of reducing existing ﬁsheries subsidies on ﬁsheries output will diﬀer, depending on the
conditions of the economy. I construct a simple general equilibrium model of two sectors:
ﬁsheries and manufacturing. A key element is variable labor supply. Each worker chooses
the optimal supply of labor by taking into account the substitution between consumption
of goods and leisure.
The main results are as follows. First, in a small open economy (SOE) where catch
quotas are not enforced and there are no alternative employment opportunities for work-
ers in the ﬁsheries sector, a reduction in subsidies for income support will increase ﬁsheries
output. This is because workers in the ﬁsheries sector try to partially oﬀset reductions
in income from cuts in subsidies by increasing labor, which results in a longer time spent
ﬁshing. A reduction in subsidies for raising the domestic producer prices of ﬁsh has a
similar eﬀect if the elasticity of substitution between leisure and the aggregate consump-
tion goods is low. Second, in an SOE where catch quotas are strictly enforced and there
are alternative employment opportunities for workers in the ﬁsheries sector, a reduction
in ﬁsheries subsidies has no eﬀect on total ﬁsheries output as long as catch quotas are
binding. However, in such an SOE, a reduction in ﬁsheries subsidies causes fewer workers
to remain in the ﬁsheries sector because workers who can earn higher incomes in another
sector will change occupations. A further reduction in ﬁsheries subsidies may result in
the number of workers in ﬁsheries becoming so small that catch quotas are no longer
5In the Chair Texts, Annex VIII (pp. 87–93) of the SCM Agreement addresses ﬁsheries subsidies. In Article I.1,
“income support for natural or legal persons engaged in marine wild capture ﬁshing” and “price support for products of
marine capture ﬁshing” are identiﬁed as (e) and (f) of subsidies that shall be prohibited (WTO, 2007).
5binding. In such a case, a reduction in subsidies reduces ﬁsheries output. Third, in the
trade between two countries, the world relative price of ﬁsheries product is endogenously
determined and hence is aﬀected by any change in ﬁsheries subsidies. If the relative
supply of ﬁsheries product increases, then the world relative price will decrease. This
indirect eﬀect through price changes reinforces the direct eﬀect of reducing ﬁsheries sub-
sidies. Consequently, even in the case of trade between two countries, subsidy reform
that reduces either income supports or price supports can expand the world catch of ﬁsh.
Thus, the results in this paper suggest that proper management of ﬁsheries resources is
important for subsidy reform to mitigate overﬁshing and conserve ﬁsheries resources.
A number of existing studies are relevant to this paper. Munro and Sumaila (2002)
and Clark et al. (2005) investigate the possible negative eﬀects of subsidies for vessel
decommissioning schemes. Both papers demonstrate that buyback subsidies generally
have a negative impact on resource conservation, if they are anticipated by ﬁshers. Lin-
debo (2005) examines the impact of the EU’s ﬂeet capacity policy. He argues that
the misguided use of subsidies for ﬂeet renewal and modernization in the past sent the
wrong signal to ﬁshers, but capacity-reducing subsidies had also achieved little success
with regard to the long-term, sustainable use of ﬁsheries resources. Using the framework
of non-cooperative game theory, Ruseski (1998) demonstrates the strategic rent-shifting
roles for ﬂeet licensing and eﬀort subsidies when two countries non-cooperatively harvest
a single ﬁsh stock. He shows that strategic eﬀort subsidies could only lead to incomplete
rent dissipation, while strategic ﬂeet licensing could lead to complete rent dissipation.
However, none of these existing studies examine the eﬀects of income support or price
support subsidies in the ﬁsheries sector.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 sets up the basic
framework of the analysis. Section 3 analyzes the eﬀects of reducing ﬁsheries subsidies
in a small open economy in which the world relative price is exogenously given. I con-
sider two diﬀerent conditions. In one case, catch quotas of ﬁshing are not enforced and
there are no alternative employment opportunities for workers in the ﬁsheries sector. In
another case, catch quotas are strictly enforced and there are alternative employment
6opportunities for workers in the ﬁsheries sector. Section 4 extends the analysis to trade
between two countries. The two cases in Section 3 correspond to the two trading partners
in Section 4. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
In this section, I construct a simple static model of worker behavior with a variable
supply of labor.6 There are two goods: ﬁsh, F, and manufactures, M. Take good M as
a numeraire and let the price of good M be one. Denote the price of ﬁsh as p.
There are N persons, indexed by i =1 ,...,N. Each is endowed with ¯ x units of labor
and supplies xi units of labor. Those persons endogenously supply labor to either the
ﬁsheries sector or the manufacturing sector. Note that Li ≡ ¯ x − xi denotes the leisure
of person i. Let us consider the ﬁsheries sector ﬁrst. Suppose that the current ﬁsheries
resource stocks are S.B y d e v o t i n g xi units of labor to ﬁshing, a person can obtain
Fi = Ei(xi;F−i,S) units of ﬁsh, where F−i =

j =i Fj. I assume that Ei(0;F−i,S)=0 ,
E 
i ≡ ∂Ei(xi;F−i,S)/∂xi > 0, and E  
i ≡ ∂2Ei(xi;F−i,S)/∂x2
i < 0. I also assume that
∂Ei(xi;F−i,S)/∂F−i < 0a n d∂Ei(xi;F−i,S)/∂S > 0.7 Denote that the total catch of
ﬁsh as F =
n
i=1 Fi,w h e r en ≤ N is the number of persons who engage in ﬁshing. In
this paper, I mainly focus on the analysis in the short-run by taking ﬁsh stock S as a
given. This is because overexploitation of renewable natural resources is mainly caused
by short-sighted behavior of people,8 and hence it is important to see the eﬀects on the
incentives for those short-sighted people. However, since the way in which a change in
policy will aﬀect ﬁsheries resource stocks is also an important issue, I will brieﬂy discuss
the eﬀects on ﬁsheries resource stocks in sections 3 and 4.
In the manufacturing sector, on the other hand, “human capital” is used as a produc-
tion factor. Person i’s supply of human capital is hixi,w h e r ehi is a parameter speciﬁc
6The structure of my model is similar to Chichilnisky’s (1994) model of resource extraction by workers from the
subsistence sector.
7An example of the function Ei(xi;F−i,S)i sFi =( S − F−i)(1 − e−xi).
8Studies on open-access renewable resources demonstrate this mechanism. See, for example, Gordon (1954) and Brander
and Taylor (1997).
7to the person and is a draw from distribution Ω(h)w i t hs u p p o r to n[ 0 ,¯ h]. One unit of
manufacturing goods is produced by a units of human capital. This implies that the
wage w per unit of human capital in the manufacturing sector is given by w =1 /a
(Recall that manufacturing goods are the numeraire). Thus, income for those employed
in the manufacturing sector is given by hixi/a. The production of manufacturing goods
is given by M =
m
i=1 hixi/a,w h e r em ≤ N is the number of persons employed in the
manufacturing sector.
To simplify the analysis, I assume that each person can only work in one sector.
Consumer tastes for consumption goods are quasi-concave and weakly separable across
the set of consumption goods and leisure.9 Utility of consumer i is given by
u
i = u(φ(f,m), ¯ x − xi),
where φ(f,m) is a linearly homogenous sub-utility function, and u is strictly increasing
and strictly quasi-concave in φ and Li.
Person i chooses m, f,a n dxi to maximize ui subject to the budget constraint:
pf + m ≤ Ii,w h e r eIi is income. When person i earns income in the ﬁsheries sector,
the income is given by Ii = qFi + t − τ,w h e r eq = p + s is the domestic producer
price of ﬁsh with s being subsidies to support the domestic price, t is income support
from the government, and τ is the lump-sum tax. When the person earns income in the
manufacturing sector, on the other hand, income is given by Ii = whixi − τ.
The government’s budget is balanced by spending the diﬀerence between tax revenue
and subsidy payments as government expenditure g.T h u s ,τ is constant and unaﬀected
by any changes in subsidy payments.
Since φ(·) is linearly homogenous, it yields
u
i = u(I
i/β(p), ¯ x − xi), (1)
where β(p) is the true price index associated with φ(·).
When person i engages in ﬁshing, the optimal supply of labor is determined by max-
imizing Eq. (1) subject to Ii = qFi + t − τ. The ﬁrst-order condition (FOC) is given
9The assumption of weak separability between consumption goods and leisure is popular in the literature of public







i − uL =0 , (2)
























i + uLL ≡ ∆, (3)
where uφφ ≡ ∂2ui/∂φ2, uLφ ≡ ∂2ui/∂(¯ x − xi)∂φ,a n duLL ≡ ∂2ui/∂(¯ x − xi)2. I assume
that ∆ < 0 so that the SOC is satisﬁed.
When person i is employed in the manufacturing sector, on the other hand, the
optimal supply of labor is determined by maximizing Eq. (1) subject to Ii = whixi −τ.
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I assume the right-hand side is negative so that the SOC is satisﬁed.
The FOCs (2) and (4) yield the demand functions for leisure L
f∗
i (p,q,Ii)a n d
Lm∗
i (p,w,Ii) when a person works in sectors F and M, respectively. As is usually
the case, I assume that leisure is a normal good in both cases, i.e., ∂L
f∗
i (p,q,Ii)/∂Ii > 0
and ∂Lm∗
i (p,w,Ii)/∂Ii > 0.
3 Fisheries Subsidies in a Small Open Economy
In this section, I examine the eﬀects of reducing existing ﬁsheries subsidies on ﬁsheries
output. The main purpose of this section is to illustrate that the eﬀects of reducing
ﬁsheries subsidies on ﬁsheries output are dependent on the economy. I consider two
types of subsidies. The ﬁrst is income supports for workers in the ﬁsheries sector. The
second is price supports for ﬁsh products. In this analysis, I consider two cases. The
ﬁrst case is that catch quotas are not enforced and there are no alternative employment
opportunities for workers in the ﬁsheries sector. The second case is that catch quotas
9are strictly enforced and there are alternative employment opportunities for workers in
the ﬁsheries sector.
In this section, I assume that the country is small in the international market, so that
the price of ﬁsh, p,i sﬁ x e d .
3.1 Unenforced catch quotas and no alternative employment opportunities
I ﬁrst consider the case where catch quotas are not enforced and there are no alternative
employment opportunities for workers in the ﬁsheries sector. There are no alternative
employment opportunities for workers in the ﬁsheries sector if the country is completely
specialized in producing good F.
Let ¯ F be the catch quota. If the total catch is below ¯ F without enforcement, there is
no problem. Thus, the implicit assumption in this subsection is that the total catch is
greater than ¯ F even in the absence of ﬁsheries subsidies.
In my model, a reduction in income support is measured by a reduction in t.T h i si s
qualitatively the same as an exogenous reduction in non-labor income. This change does
not aﬀect consumption allocation between good F and good M. However, it does aﬀect
the level of consumption of leisure. Since leisure is a normal good, a reduction in income
leads to a reduction in leisure for an individual person. This implies that the person is
willing to spend more time ﬁshing. This eﬀect can be obtained by totally diﬀerentiating
















Note that ∆ < 0 by the SOC, uφφ < 0, E 
i > 0, and uLφ < 0. The overall sign of the
terms in the square brackets is negative under the assumption that leisure is a normal
good. This result implies that a reduction in t decreases Li and increases xi.
Since this is true for all workers who engage in ﬁshing and since all workers in the
economy work in the ﬁsheries sector, I obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 In a country where catch quotas are not enforced and there are no al-
ternative employment opportunities for workers in the ﬁsheries sector, a reduction in
10income support t leads to greater output in the ﬁsheries sector.
I next consider a reduction in subsidies s.S i n c ed s =d q, a reduction in s is equivalent
to a reduction in q. The eﬀects of this price change on the optimal supply of labor can




















In the above equation, the ﬁrst term represents the substitution eﬀect between leisure
and aggregate consumption goods. This term is negative because ∆ < 0a n duφ > 0,
implying that a reduction in s will decrease the optimal supply of labor. Since a reduction
in s decreases the opportunity cost of leisure, it is optimal for a person to increase leisure
and hence to decrease the supply of labor.
The second block of terms, including terms in the square brackets in Eq. (6), measures
the income eﬀect, which is positive. The reason is the same as that in Eq. (5). Since
a reduction in s decreases nominal income and since leisure is a normal good, then a
reduction in s decreases leisure and hence increases the supply of labor. Therefore, the
overall eﬀect depends on the relative size of these two eﬀects. Actually, if the elasticity
of substitution between leisure and aggregate consumption goods is less than one, the
substitution eﬀect is relatively small. In such a situation, the substitution eﬀect is
dominated by the income eﬀect and hence a reduction in s increases the supply of labor.
Thus, the following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 2 In a country where catch quotas are not enforced and there are no al-
ternative employment opportunities for workers in the ﬁsheries sector, a reduction in
subsidies s leads to greater output in the ﬁsheries sector if the elasticity of substitution
between leisure and aggregate consumption goods is less than one.
Using indiﬀerence curves and budget lines, Figure 1 illustrates how a change in s
aﬀects the optimal choice of leisure and supply of labor. In this ﬁgure, leisure, Li,i s
taken along the horizontal axis and the aggregate consumption goods, φ, is taken along
the vertical axis. E indicates an endowment point. Under the initial level of s,t h e


















Figure 1: Substitution and income eﬀects
leisure is L0
i. Thus, the supply of labor is given by x0
i =¯ x − L0
i. Then, a reduction
in s causes the budget line to rotate around point E, as shown in the ﬁgure. The new
optimal choice is at point B and L1
i is chosen, where L1
i <L 0
i. Thus, the supply of labor
is x1
i =¯ x − L1
i,w h e r ex1
i >x 0
i holds. The change from A to B can be decomposed
into two parts. The ﬁrst part is the movement from A to C. This corresponds to the
substitution eﬀect. As is explained above, the substitution eﬀect in this case tends to
increase leisure and hence decrease the supply of labor. In the ﬁgure, this is illustrated
by an arrow pointing to the right. The second part is the movement from C to B.
This corresponds to the (negative) income eﬀect. Since leisure is a normal good, the
negative income eﬀect tends to decrease leisure and increase the supply of labor. This
is illustrated by an arrow pointing to the left. Figure 1 illustrates the case in which the
income eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect.
Propositions 1 and 2 show that a reduction in the existing ﬁsheries subsidies can
increase rather than decrease ﬁsheries output under certain conditions.
So far, I have not mentioned the eﬀects on the ﬁsheries resource stocks. By using a
stock-recruitment model of ﬁsheries economics, a change in the resource stocks can be
12formulated as follows.10 Let St and St+1 be the stocks at the beginning of the ﬁshing
period t and t+1, respectively. Let also Rt and G(·) be the stock left behind after ﬁshing
in period t and the growth function of the ﬁsh stocks, respectively. Then, it holds that
St+1 = Rt + G(Rt)a n dFt = St − Rt,w h e r eFt is the total catch in period t.
If St+1 <S t, then the stock is reduced by ﬁshing. This can be considered a case of
overﬁshing. Then, if the catch quota ¯ F is set at the level that yields St+1 = St, a total
catch above ¯ F means overﬁshing. Thus, if that is the case in Propositions 1 and 2, a
reduction in either t or s aggravates overﬁshing and causes the ﬁsheries resource stocks
to decrease.
3.2 Enforced catch quotas and the presence of alternative employment op-
portunities
I now turn to the case in which catch quotas are strictly enforced and there are al-
ternative employment opportunities for workers in the ﬁsheries sector. The country is
diversiﬁed, and workers can move across sectors under the conditions speciﬁed in the
previous section.
A catch quota, ¯ F, is binding if ¯ F ≤ F =
n
i=1 Fi. Under the binding catch quota,
the output per person is simply given by dividing the quota by the number of workers
in the ﬁsheries sector.
As was described in the previous section, the sectoral allocation of workers is de-
termined by the relative level of individual income in the two sectors. As long as the







for i =1 ,...,n, (7)
where ˜ xi on the right-hand side satisﬁes Eq. (4). If the catch quota is not binding, on




for i =1 ,...,n, (8)
10As for the stock-recruitment model, see, for example, Clark (1990, Chapter 7).
13where ˆ xi on the left-hand side satisﬁes Eq. (2).
Now, consider a reduction in t. If the catch quota is binding, as is obvious from Eq.
(7), n decreases because those who have relatively higher human capital move to the
manufacturing sector. Consequently, a reduction in t increases the quota per person.
However, as long as ¯ F ≤ nEi(ˆ xi) holds, the total output of the ﬁsheries sector remains
the same. A further reduction in t may cause ¯ F>n E i(ˆ xi) to hold. Then, the total
output decreases. The following proposition summarizes the above analysis.
Proposition 3 In a country where catch quotas are strictly enforced and there are al-
ternative employment opportunities for workers in the ﬁsheries sector, a small reduction
in income support t does not change the total output in the ﬁsheries sector if the catch
quota is initially binding. A further reduction in t may decrease the total output in the
ﬁsheries sector.
Consider next a reduction in subsidies s. If the catch quota is binding, the number






for i =1 ,...,n. (9)




for i =1 ,...,n, (10)
Note that since s aﬀects ˆ xi, in Eq. (10) Ei(ˆ xi) also changes in response to a change in s.
Otherwise, the eﬀects of a reduction in s are qualitatively similar to those of a reduction
in t, as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 In a country where catch quotas are strictly enforced and there are al-
ternative employment opportunities for workers in the ﬁsheries sector, a small reduction
in subsidies s does not change the total output in the ﬁsheries sector if the catch quota is
initially binding. A further reduction in s may decrease the total output in the ﬁsheries
sector.
Unlike the case in the previous subsection, as long as the catch quota is properly
set and strictly enforced, ﬁsh stocks are maintained. However, it is sometimes stated
14that catch quotas are set at levels that result in overﬁshing. If that is the case, then
the ﬁsheries resource stocks can be reduced even if catch quotas are strictly enforced.
Therefore, it is important to note that the results in Propositions 3 and 4 do not guarantee
that the ﬁsheries resource stocks in this country are maintained at the appropriate level.
A comparison between Propositions 1 and 2 and Propositions 3 and 4 reveals that
the eﬀects of a reduction in some types of ﬁsheries subsidies are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent,
depending on the conditions of the country.
4 Subsidy Reform in Two-Country Trade
In the previous section, I examined the eﬀects of reducing existing ﬁsheries subsidies on
the output of the ﬁsheries sector in the framework of a small open economy. In this
section, I extend the analysis to the case of two-country trade.
There are two countries: Home and Foreign. The basic structure of the economy
in Section 2 is retained for both countries. Variables in Home are indicated with no
asterisk and those in Foreign are indicated with an asterisk (∗). I assume that Home has a
comparative advantage in producing manufacturing goods and Foreign has a comparative
advantage in producing ﬁsh. More speciﬁcally, I impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1 Under free trade without subsidies, Home is diversiﬁed and Foreign is
completely specialized in producing ﬁsh in equilibrium.
Under this assumption, Home exports good M and imports good F and Foreign ex-
ports good F and imports good M. Moreover, world demand (i.e., total demand in
the two countries) for good F is suﬃciently strong to require that even Home, which
has a comparative disadvantage in producing good F, produces good F in the trading
equilibrium.
Moreover, with respect to the enforcement of catch quotas in the ﬁsheries sector, I
assume the following:
Assumption 2 Catch quotas in the ﬁsheries sector are strictly enforced in Home but
are not enforced at all in Foreign.
15Then, consider a situation in which subsidies for income support, t is initially provided
in each country (and s = s∗ = 0). Since the subsidies encourage workers to enter the
ﬁsheries sector, Foreign continues to specialize in producing ﬁsh. In order for Home to






for some j and n<N.
Now consider subsidy reform where t is reduced (but is still positive after the reform) in
both countries. From Propositions 1 and 3, I know that a reduction in t∗ increases output
in the ﬁsheries sector in Foreign and that a reduction in t keeps output in the ﬁsheries
sector constant or may decrease it in Home, holding p constant. In the framework of
two-country trade, however, a change in t and t∗ can also aﬀect the world relative price
p. If the catch quota is binding even after a change in t in Home, the eﬀect on the world
relative price is unambiguous. Thus, the following assumption is imposed:
Assumption 3 In Home, the catch quota in the ﬁsheries sector is binding even after a
reduction in t.
Under this assumption, a reduction in t does not aﬀect the world supply of ﬁsh. On
the other hand, a reduction in t∗ unambiguously increases the world supply of ﬁsh for a
given p. Thus, it causes p to fall. From Proposition 2, this price change further increases
output in the ﬁsheries sector in Foreign if the elasticity of substitution between leisure
and aggregate consumption goods is less than one. The overall eﬀect in Foreign can be










































In the right-hand side, the ﬁrst block of terms, including those in the ﬁrst square
brackets, represents the direct eﬀect of a change in t∗ on x∗
i. As was discussed for Eq.
16(5), the sign is positive. The terms in the second square brackets represent the indirect
eﬀects through a change in p. In the second square brackets, there are two elements.
The ﬁrst element measures the income eﬀect. The income eﬀect captures both the eﬀect
due to a change in the nominal income and the eﬀect due to a change in the price index
that aﬀects real income. As long as t∗ is suﬃciently small, the income eﬀect works
to increase the supply of labor. The second element measures the substitution eﬀect
between leisure and consumption goods. Although an increase in p increases both the
opportunity cost of leisure (pE 
i) and the price of aggregate consumption goods (β(p)), the
relative price of leisure to consumption goods increases. This result is obtained from the
property β (p) <β (p)/p that comes from the concavity of β(p). Consequently, the second
element is negative, meaning that the substitution eﬀect works to reduce the supply of
labor. As was discussed in Eq. (6), if the elasticity of the substitution between leisure
and aggregate consumption goods is less than one, the substitution eﬀect is dominated
by the income eﬀect and hence a reduction in p increases the supply of labor. Since
−dp/dt∗ < 0, the overall eﬀect of the indirect eﬀect is positive and hence the indirect
eﬀect reinforces the direct eﬀect.
In Home, on the other hand, a drop in t has no eﬀect on xi as long as the catch quota
is binding. Thus, the following result is obtained.
Proposition 5 When Home and Foreign are characterized by Assumptions 1, 2, and 3
and trade with each other, subsidy reform where t and t∗ are reduced causes the world
catch of ﬁsh to increase if t∗ is initially suﬃciently small and if the elasticity of substi-
tution between leisure and aggregate consumption goods is less than one in Foreign.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, this proposition shows that worldwide subsidy reform
to reduce one type of ﬁsheries subsidies could increase the world catch of ﬁsh. This
counterintuitive result mainly arises from the endogenous supply of labor. In many
developing countries, subsistence workers engage in ﬁsheries, and it is likely that there
are no alternative employment opportunities for those workers. In such a case, the result
of Proposition 5 is not surprising.11
11The results are actually consistent with real world phenomena as presented by World Bank (1992). According to
17The condition that the elasticity of substitution between leisure and the aggregate con-
sumption goods is less than one is actually plausible and rather general, as Chichilnisky
(1994) discusses. Therefore, the result of Proposition 5 is not a special case but a plau-
sible case.
Subsidy reform to reduce subsidies s has a similar eﬀect. Suppose that initially s>0,
s∗ > 0a n dt = t∗ = 0 in both countries. Then, consider a reduction in s and s∗.
Similarly to Assumption 3, a change in s has no eﬀect on the world supply of ﬁsh under
the following assumption:
Assumption 4 In Home, the catch quota in the ﬁsheries sector is binding even after a
reduction in s.
I then focus on the analysis in Foreign. Recall that in the case of Eq. (6), a change in s∗
only changes the domestic producer price q∗. When the world relative price of ﬁsheries
product p is endogenously determined, the domestic consumer price and the domestic
producer price changes due to a change in ﬁsheries subsidies. Totally diﬀerentiate Eq.




























Recall that ∆ < 0 and from Eq. (6) the overall sign of the terms in the ﬁrst square
brackets is negative if the elasticity of substitution between leisure and aggregate con-
sumption goods is less than one. Moreover, since dp/ds∗ > 0a n dβ (p) <β (p)/p,t h e
overall sign of the second square brackets is positive as long as s∗ is initially suﬃciently
small. Thus, it yields that −dx∗
i/ds∗ > 0. Similarly to the case of a reduction in t,t h e
eﬀect through a change in p reinforces the direct eﬀect of a change in s∗. Therefore,
subsidy reform where s and s∗ are reduced increases the world output in the ﬁsheries
sector, as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 When Home and Foreign, characterized by Assumptions 1, 2, and 4,
trade with each other, subsidy reform that s and s∗ are reduced causes the world catch
World Bank (1992), when the price of a resource good falls, low-income people work harder and extract more resources
in order to meet consumption needs.
18o fﬁ s ht oi n c r e a s ei fs∗ is initially suﬃciently small and if the elasticity of substitution
between leisure and aggregate consumption goods is less than one in Foreign.
As discussed at the end of section 3.1, if catch quota ¯ F is set at a level that keeps the
stock at the beginning of the ﬁshing period constant, i.e., St+1 = St, in each country,
a total catch above ¯ F means overﬁshing. Thus, Propositions 5 and 6 illustrate the
possibility that subsidy reform will accelerate overﬁshing and reductions in stocks.
In summary, the analysis in this section shows that subsidy reform to reduce ﬁsheries
subsidies could expand the total supply of ﬁsheries products and reduce world ﬁsheries
resource stocks under certain conditions.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I investigated the eﬀects of reducing existing subsidies in the ﬁsheries
sector. The conventional wisdom is that ﬁsheries subsidies cause overﬁshing and hence
a reduction in ﬁsheries subsidies will contribute to mitigating overﬁshing and conserving
ﬁsheries resources. Conversely, the analysis of this paper suggests that under some con-
ditions the opposite result may be true. That is, a reduction in ﬁsheries subsidies may
accelerate overﬁshing and reduce ﬁsheries resource stocks. The key is how the change
in subsidies will aﬀect the incentives of workers who engage in ﬁsheries. If a reduc-
tion in subsidies causes workers to put more eﬀort into ﬁshing, it may yield unexpected
and undesirable results in counties where ﬁsheries resources are not properly managed.
Therefore, in designing new regulations on ﬁsheries subsidies at the WTO, the eﬀects of
reducing ﬁsheries subsidies should be carefully examined after consideration of the con-
ditions in diﬀerent countries. Strengthening ﬁsheries resource management will ensure
that subsidy reform mitigates overﬁshing and conserves ﬁsheries resources.
In this paper, I focused on an analysis of the short-term consequence. However, since
the long-run implications of any policy reform are also important, the next step in the
research is to extend the analysis to an examination of the transition and steady states of
the dynamic framework. Also, in this paper, I focused on two types of ﬁsheries subsidies.
19It may be interesting to analyze the eﬀects of reducing other types of ﬁsheries subsidies.
Moreover, empirical investigations to evaluate the theoretical predictions about the ef-
fects of reducing ﬁsheries subsidies are very important in the design of new regulations
governing ﬁsheries subsidies.
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